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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Thomas Peterson appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. Peterson claims the
district court dismissed his successive petition without first providing him notice of
the reasons for dismissal and without first deciding whether he was entitled to
counsel.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2010-10642 ("Case No. 10642"), the
state charged Peterson with felony violation of a no contact order that prohibited
Peterson from contacting Dorene Giannini.
241-242.)

(#39146/#39147 R. 1 , pp.224-225,

Pursuant to Peterson's motion, Case No. 10642 was consolidated

with Ada Count Case No. CR-FE-2008-17740 ("Case No. 17740"), which
involved another violation of a no contact order charge (third offense) involving
Dorene to which Peterson pied guilty in January 2009.

1

(#39146/#39147 R.,

Peterson filed a motion to take judicial notice of the "appellate records" in
"Idaho Supreme Court Docket Numbers 39147 and 39783," which were
consolidated on appeal. (Motion Requesting That The Court Take Judicial
Notice, p.1, filed October 15, 2014.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted the
motion and has "take[n] judicial notice of the Clerk's Record, Reporter's
Transcripts, and Exhibits in Supreme Court Docket Nos. 39147 and 39783, State
v. Thomas Edward Peterson." (Order Granting Motion Requesting The Court
Take Judicial Notice, filed October 20, 2014.) In its order, the Court correctly
"noted that Supreme Court Docket No. 39147 and 39783 were both consolidated
to 39146 in a previous appeal, but 39146 has not been consolidated to this
case." (Id.) Because the criminal case associated with Docket No. 39146 was
consolidated at the trial level with the criminal case associated with Docket No.
39147, contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion requesting that
the Court also take judicial notice of the Clerk's Record, Reporter's Transcripts,
and Exhibits in Docket No. 39146.
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pp.12-13, 34-37, 54-55.) The cases were consolidated for "purposes of plea and
sentencing" because the charge in Case No. 10642 resulted in a probation
violation in Case No. 17740.

(#39146/#39147 R., pp.129-131, 136-137, 245,

252.) Peterson pied guilty to the felony charge in Case No. 10642 and admitted
violating his probation in Case No. 17740; the district court imposed a suspended
sentence in Case No. 10642 and reinstated Peterson on probation in Case No.
17740. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.138-143, 254-257, 259-264.)
Three months later the state filed motions to violate Peterson's probation
in both cases. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.157-160, 278-280.) Both motions alleged
that Peterson again violated the no contact order, including that Peterson called
Dorene 40 times and sent her 145 text messages between December 21, 2010,
and December 25, 2010. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.158, 279.) The state later filed
an amended motion that, in addition to the allegations regarding Peterson's no
contact order violations, noted that the state had charged Peterson with another
felony no contact order violation in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2011-3748
("Case No. 3748") (Docket No. 39783).

(#39146/#39147 R., pp.171-174, 291-

294.) At his arraignment on the probation violation allegations, defense counsel
noted that the preliminary hearing on the "new charge" was set for March 25;
accordingly, the court set the matter for review on March 31, 2011, with a
probation violation hearing scheduled for April 21, 2011.

(#39146/#39147 R.,

pp.176, 296.)
In Case No. 3748, the preliminary hearing proceeded as scheduled on
March 25, 2011, and the magistrate bound Peterson over to district court.
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(#39783 R., pp.20-25.) At the subsequent March 31 review hearing in Case Nos.
17740 and 10642, defense counsel noted he might request consolidation with a
plea agreement in the "other" case. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.178, 298.)
At the April 21 hearing scheduled for the probation violations, defense
counsel requested a reset because the "new felony charge [was] set for trial in
June." (#39146/#39147 R., pp.180, 300.) The court granted the request and
scheduled the matter for review on June 16. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.180, 300.)
On May 20, 2011, Peterson pied guilty to the felony violation of a no
contact order in Case No. 3748. (#39783 R., pp.37-44; #39783 5/20/2011 Tr.,
p.19, L.11 - p.25, L.18.)
On June 16, 2011, Peterson admitted violating his probation in Case Nos.
17740 and 10642 by having contact with Dorene and by "a specific instance of
violation, to which [Peterson] pied guilty" and was "awaiting sentencing,"
presumably referring to Case No. 3748
Ls.11-25, p.16, L.18 - p.18, L.5.)

(#39146/#39147 6/16/2011 Tr., p.5,

Peterson appeared before the court the

following day in Case No. 37 48 at which time defense counsel noted the court in
Peterson's other cases ordered a mental health evaluation the day prior; 2 the
court therefore reset the case for review and possible sentencing. (#39783 R.,
p.46.) At a subsequent review hearing, the court in Case No. 3748 indicated it
would not impose sentence until the court sentenced Peterson on his probation
violations in Case Nos. 17740 and 10642. (#39783 R., p.52.)

The Honorable Patrick Owen presided over Case No. 3748 and the Honorable
Mike Wetherell presided over Case Nos. 17740 and 10642.

2

3

On September 6, 2011, the court revoked Peterson's probation in Case
Nos. 17740 and 10642 and ordered his sentences executed. (#39146/#39147
R., pp.195-197, 316-318.)

Peterson requested a reduction in his sentences,

which the district court denied. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.199, 215-218, 320, 336339.)
On September 14, 2011, the court imposed sentence in Case No. 3748,
ordering a five-year sentence with one and one-half years fixed, to run
consecutive to the sentences imposed in Case Nos. 17740 and 10642. (#39783
R., pp.55-57.) Peterson also requested reconsideration of the sentence in Case
No. 3748, which the district court denied. (#39783 R., pp.60, 69-72.)
In his consolidated appeal in Case Nos. 17740, 10642, and 3748 (Docket
Nos. 39146/39147/39783), Peterson raised three issues: (1) whether the district
court violated his rights "by failing to maintain an accurate copy of the record in
his case"; (2) whether the court abused its discretion by revoking Peterson's
probation in Case Nos. 17740 and 10642; and (3) whether the court abused its
discretion by denying Peterson's Rule 35 motions.

(#39146/#39147/#39783

Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The Idaho Court of Appeals denied relief on all three
issues and affirmed.

State v. Peterson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 408

(Idaho App. March 19, 2013).
On June 6, 2012, while his direct appeal was pending, Peterson filed a

4

petition for post-conviction relief in relation to Case No. 10642.
pp.3-9.)

(#41088 R. 3,

The allegations in Peterson's initial petition included assertions that

evidence "exist[ed]" that was "not previously presented or heard" that "may
require" Peterson's sentence to be "vacated," and that counsel was ineffective
because he allegedly did not give "adequate" or "competent advice" before
Peterson "accepted" the plea agreement, and did not ask "for a better plea
aggreement [sic]."

(#41088 R., pp.4-5.)

In his supporting affidavit, Peterson

averred that on December 4, 2009, Dorene filed a motion to modify or dismiss
the no contact order in which Dorene stated (verbatim): "If its in place I can't
visit, write, or speak with him. I don't want this order I am not afraid of Tom or in
need of protection. I want to be with him. Please remove it. If not for Tom, for
myself."4 (#41088 R., p.8.) Peterson further averred that if the no contact order
would have been dismissed at that time, "the future felony cases that occurred in
2010 & 2011 wouldn'tve [sic] occurred" and he "should've received advice by a
counselor before accepting the plea agreement." (#41088 R., p.8.) The district
court granted Peterson's request for counsel on his first petition.

(#41088 R.,

pp.10-12, 22-23.)

The state's motion for judicial notice filed contemporaneously with this brief also
includes a request to take judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and the appellate
pleadings in Docket No. 41088, which is the appeal from the dismissal of
Peterson's initial post-conviction petition related to Case No. 10642.
3

4

A review of the record in Docket Nos. 39146/39147 shows that this is an
accurate representation of a motion to modify the no contact order filed by
Dorene in Case No. 17740. (#39146/#39147 R., p.97.) The district court held a
hearing on Dorene's request and amended the no contact order in that case to
allow telephone contact. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.99-101.)
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After the court issued a notice of intent to dismiss, and following a stay
while Peterson litigated his direct appeal, post-conviction counsel filed a Notice of
Intent to Proceed on Original Petition and Request for Hearing, noting that,
"[u]pon investigation," he was "unable to amend the pleadings pursuant to the
UPCPA and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." (#41088 R., pp.30-37, 75-76.)
The district court ultimately dismissed Peterson's petition because Peterson
failed to allege a "prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel."
(#41088 R., pp.85-88.)
Peterson appealed the dismissal of his first post-conviction petition and
the court appointed the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") to represent
him on appeal. (#41088 R., pp.91-97.) The SAPD, however, was granted leave
to withdraw; the basis of the SAPD's request to withdraw was appellate counsel's
inability to identify a viable issue to raise on appeal. (#41088 Motion for Leave to
Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated November 20, 2013;
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule, dated November 20, 2013; Order Granting Motion for Leave to
Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed December 31, 2013.) The
Idaho Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Peterson's appeal because
Peterson failed to timely file a brief. (#41088 Order of Dismissal, filed June 20,
2014.)
On January 23, 2014, Peterson filed a successive petition for postconviction relief, raising three claims: (1) a "due process violation by failing to
maintain an accurate copy of the record of this case"; (2) ineffective assistance of

6

counsel; and (3) a "civil rights violation."

(R., pp.3-6.)

Peterson's ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was based on counsel's alleged failure to notify the
court "and or" the prosecutor that Peterson requested a binding Rule 11 plea
agreement and counsel's alleged failure to obtain a transcript of the preliminary
hearing "involving CR-FE-2011-0003748."

(R., pp.4-5.)

Peterson also filed a

motion requesting the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.17-19.) On February 24,
2014, the district court entered an order denying Peterson's request for counsel
and a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). (R., pp.22-26.)
On that same date, the state filed an answer to Peterson's petition. (R., pp.2730.)
On March 3, 2014, Peterson filed a response to the court's February 24,
2014 order and notice. (R., pp.31-34.) Three weeks later, on March 24, 2014,
the court entered an order dismissing Peterson's successive petition and a Final
Judgment.

(R., pp.35-44.)

Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal and the

district court granted Peterson's request for counsel on appeal. (R., pp.46-48,
58-63.)
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ISSUES
Peterson states the issues on appeal as:
1. Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr.
Peterson's successive petition without providing him notice of
the reason for dismissal and providing him a meaningful
opportunity to respond thereto?
2. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr.
Peterson's petition without first resolving the question of
whether counsel should be appointed and when his allegations
established the possibility of a valid claim?
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Peterson failed to show reversible error in the summary dismissal of
his successive post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Peterson Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Summary Dismissal Of
His Successive Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Peterson asserts the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his

successive post-conviction petition.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-16.)

Peterson

presents two arguments in support of this assertion. First, Peterson claims the
district court erred by failing to provide him notice that his petition could be
dismissed on the grounds that it was a successive petition, which is barred by
I.C. § 19-4908 unless the petitioner shows a sufficient reason why his claims
were not raised in his original petition.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.)

Second,

Peterson claims the district court erred by dismissing his petition without first
deciding whether he alleged the possibility of a valid claim entitling him to the
appointment of counsel.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.)

Both of Peterson's

arguments fail.
Although Peterson correctly asserts that the district court did not give him
notice that his successive petition could be dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908,
the court dismissed Peterson's successive petition on the alternative basis that
Peterson failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact - a basis that was
included in the court's notice of intent to dismiss and is not challenged on appeal.
(R., pp.40-42.)

Further, this Court can find any error in the lack of notice of

dismissal based on I.C. § 19-4908 harmless in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's
opinion in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), in which the
Court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's successive petition for the reason,
9

articulated for the first time on appeal, that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is not a sufficient reason for purposes of I.C. § 19-4908.
With respect to Peterson's second argument - that the court erred by
dismissing his successive petition without first considering his request for counsel
- the record shows that the court did consider the request in conjunction with its
notice of intent to dismiss and the authority upon which Peterson relies does not
compel the conclusion that the district court was required to reconsider the
request before finally dismissing Peterson's petition.

8.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Because The District Court Dismissed Peterson's Petition On A Basis
That Peterson Received Notice Of, And Which Peterson Does Not
Challenge On Appeal, This Court Does Not Need To Consider Any Lack
Of Notice Of Dismissal Based On I.C. § 19-4908
Idaho Code Section 19-4906(b) allows a district court to issue a notice of

intent to dismiss if it is "satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or
motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief
and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings." When the district
court issues a notice of intent pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), it must give the
applicant "an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal."
10

In its summary dismissal order, the district court notified Peterson of its
intent to dismiss his successive petition because Peterson failed to allege a
genuine issue of material fact. (R., p.25.) The state filed an answer the same
day asserting, among other defenses, that Peterson's petition was successive
and therefore procedurally barred by I.C. § 19-4908(b). (R., p.29.) Idaho Code
Section 19-4908(b) provides that "All grounds for relief available to an applicant
under this act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended
application" and that "[a]ny ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligent waived . . . may not be the basis for a
subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which
for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original,
supplemental, or amended application."

The district court included I.C. § 19-

4908 as grounds for dismissal in its final dismissal order even though it was not
included in the court's notice - a point which the court acknowledged. (R., pp.3738.)
Peterson's entire lack of notice claim is premised on the district court's
failure to give him 20-days notice that his petition could be dismissed based on
I.C. § 19-4908.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.)

Peterson does not, however,

explain why this Court should address the lack of notice of dismissal based on
1.C. § 19-4908 given the alternative ground for dismissal, which was included in
the court's notice of intent to dismiss, that Peterson failed to allege a genuine
issue of material fact (R., pp.25, 40-41) - a conclusion Peterson does not

11

challenge on appeal (see generally Appellant's Brief, pp.8-16 5). When the basis
for a trial court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, an appellate court will affirm
on the unchallenged basis. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d
1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998). This Court should, therefore, uphold the summary
dismissal of Peterson's successive post-conviction petition on the district court's
alternative and unchallenged basis for dismissal.

kl

This Court may also conclude that the lack of notice of dismissal based on
I.C. § 19-4908 is harmless.

The Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in

Murphy, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365, supports application of harmless error in
this case. Murphy, like this case, involved a successive petition.
327 P.3d at 366-367.

kl

at 390-391,

Murphy asserted that ineffective assistance of post-

conviction counsel was a sufficient reason to allow her to file a successive
petition.

kl

at 392, 327 P.3d at 368. The district court rejected this argument

because "Murphy failed to show that her prior post-conviction counsel
inadequately presented her claims in her original petition or otherwise waived
meritorious claims."

kl

Although Peterson claims he alleged facts which raised the possibility of a valid
claim that he believes entitled him to the appointment of counsel (Appellant's
Brief, pp.11-16), such a claim is different than an argument that Peterson alleged
a genuine issue of material fact that entitled him to an evidentiary hearing. As
the Court of Appeals noted in Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct.
App. 2009) (citation omitted): "The determination whether to appoint counsel and
the determination whether a petition is subject to summary dismissal are thus
controlled by quite different standards, with the threshold showing that is
necessary in order to gain appointment of counsel being considerably lower than
that which is necessary to avoid summary dismissal of a petition." Even if this
Court considers whether Peterson alleged a genuine issue of material fact, the
district court correctly concluded he did not. (See R., pp.40-42 (Appendix A).)
5
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On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court, in deciding whether Murphy could
"bring a successive petition under § 19-4908 ... first look[ed] at her postconviction procedural history." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369. The
Court noted that Murphy filed her first petition in 2004, which ultimately resulted
in an evidentiary hearing on some of her claims.

1st at 393-394,

327 P.3d at 369-

370. While her appeal from her original petition was pending, Murphy filed her
successive petition "alleging a number of claims regarding ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel and seeking the appointment of counsel."

1st at 394,

327 P.3d at 370. "The district court found that Murphy had failed to raise the
possibility of a valid claim as to any of her claims and so denied the appointment
of counsel and summarily dismissed her successive petition."

1st

On appeal from the dismissal of her successive petition, Murphy
acknowledged she already litigated one post-conviction case, but argued that,
even though she had no new evidence to present, she could pursue a
successive petition "raising new claims and reasserting claims from her first
petition" because counsel in the original post-conviction case had been
ineffective.

Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394, 327 P.3d at 370.

The Court rejected

Murphy's argument, holding that "because Murphy ha[d] no statutory or
constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, she [could
not] demonstrate 'sufficient reason' for filing a successive petition based on
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel."

1st

at 395, 327 P.3d at 371. The

Court therefore affirmed the district court's order denying Murphy's request for
counsel and summarily dismissing her successive petition.

13

Although Peterson, unlike Murphy, did not allege a sufficient reason or
explain why he should be permitted to avoid the successive petition bar, a review
of his post-conviction case history shows that, despite his claim otherwise, there
is no reasonably legitimate reason that would allow him to pursue a successive
petition relating to his claim that counsel, in representing him in Case No. 10642,
was ineffective for failing to request a preliminary hearing transcript from Case
No. 3748. 6 (Appellant's Brief, p.10 n.3 (claiming it is possible he "could, given
the meaningful opportunity (particularly if he were afforded the assistance of
counsel), [to] justify why [his] claims were not presented in his initial petition").)
When Peterson filed his first post-conviction petition in relation to Case No.
10642, he was obviously aware that he admitted the probation violation
allegation that was based on the charge in Case No. 3748 and did so without first
reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript from that case.

Moreover, it is a

mystery why he would need to review the transcript of a hearing he attended
before he could be aware of what happened at that hearing. (#39783 R., pp.2023 (court minutes from preliminary hearing in Case No. 3748, which include
notation that Peterson was "present, in custody").) In any event, Peterson was
undoubtedly aware of the basic factual predicate of his current claim at the time
he filed his first post-conviction petition and the state cannot conceive a basis for
him to assert otherwise. Cf. Judd, 148 Idaho at 26, 218 P.3d at 5 (in addressing

6

Although Peterson raised other claims in his successive petition, Peterson "is
not challenging the decision to dismiss the due process and civil rights claims,"
and it appears the only ineffective assistance of counsel claim he believes is
"possibly valid" is his claim that counsel should have requested a preliminary
hearing transcript. (Appellant's Brief, p.3 n.2 and pp.11-15.)
14

issue of tolling and whether the petitioner raised the possibility of a valid claim,
Court noted it is the discovery of facts, not the discovery of law that would allow
for tolling).
Further, the gist of Peterson's first post-conviction petition, at least as it
related to the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, was that counsel
failed to adequately advise him regarding his guilty plea, and the facts he offered
in support of the claim were based on Dorene's desire to have contact with him
and her attempt to modify the no contact order to allow for such. (#41088 R.,
pp.5, 8.)

While Peterson's successive claim is based on missing telephone

records to support the state's charge in Case No. 3748, his desire for those
records was to establish that Dorene wanted to have contact with him and
allegedly "manipulated and bribed [him] to continue contact."

(R., pp.8, 32.)

Thus, the essence of Peterson's successive petition claim is the same as the
claim in his first post-conviction case; he is just approaching his assertion from a
different angle. It is also worth nothing that Peterson had the assistance of postconviction counsel in his first case and that attorney, after investigating the
matter, found no other evidence to offer in support of Peterson's petition. (R.,
p.76.)
Given the foregoing history of Peterson's post-conviction proceedings and
the Court's conclusion in Murphy that ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel is not sufficient reason to pursue a successive petition, even if Peterson
would claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective, there appears to be no
legitimate factual or legal reason that would allow Peterson to avoid the

15

successive petition bar in LC. § 19-4908. Even though the district court did not
give Peterson notice of dismissal on this basis, the petitioner in Murphy also did
not receive notice that her successive petition could be dismissed because
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel did not constitute a sufficient
reason, but the Court affirmed the summary court's dismissal for this reason.
This Court could likewise affirm the summary dismissal of Peterson's petition
based on I.C. § 19-4908 despite the lack of notice.
Because Peterson does not challenge the district court's dismissal of his
successive petition on the ground that he failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact, this Court need not address his claim regarding the lack of notice of
dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908.

Even if considered, based on the

information in the record, Peterson's post-conviction history, and the fact that any
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel, although not alleged by Peterson,
would not qualify as a sufficient reason for filing a successive petition, this Court
may affirm the district court's dismissal on this alternative basis despite the lack
of notice.

D.

Peterson's Claim That The District Court Failed To Address His Request
For Counsel Before Dismissing His Petition Is Without Merit As Is His
Claim That He Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim Entitling Him To
Counsel
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is

governed by I.C. § 19-4904." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 392, 327 P.3d at 368. The
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the
discretion of the district court.

kl

(citing Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 738, 228
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P.3d 998, 1005 (2010)); Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d
1108, 1111 (2004))

If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts

showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
654,152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793,102 P.3d at 1112.
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164
P.3d 798, 809 (2007). Requests for post-conviction counsel must, however, be
addressed "before denying post-conviction relief on its merits." Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to
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questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho
676,678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102
P. 3d at 1111 .
In conjunction with its notice of intent to dismiss, the district court first
considered Peterson's request for counsel. (R., pp.22-24.) In doing so, the court
cited and applied the correct legal standards and concluded Peterson was not
entitled to counsel because he failed to allege the possibility of a valid claim.
(Id.) Specifically, with respect to Peterson's claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to request the preliminary hearing transcript in Case No. 37 48, the court
stated:
While trial courts are to liberally appoint counsel where the
petitioner alleges facts raising the possibility of a viable claim, a
bare statement that counsel did not ask for a particular transcript at
state expense does not provide enough information for the Court to
make such a threshold determination, because such a decision by
counsel standing alone is not deficient performance. Further,
counsel's refusal of a defendant's request that he or she ask the
Court for a particular preliminary hearing transcript in no way
supports an inference that counsel did not investigate whether
some aspect of the hearing might be used to support the defense.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Peterson's motion for
appointment of counsel at the public's expense is hereby DENIED.
(R., p.24 (emphasis original).)
After considering and denying Peterson's request for counsel, the court
articulated the reasons it intended to dismiss Peterson's petition and notified him
he had 20 days to respond. (R., p.25.) The court also gave Peterson direction
on what information should be included in his response and advised Peterson
that "[u]pon timely receipt of [his] supplemental affidavit, the Court [would]
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reconsider the issue of appointing counsel and whether the petition should be
dismissed." (R., p.25.) Peterson thereafter filed a response to the court's notice
after which the court entered an order dismissing his petition. (R., pp.31-42.) As
previously noted, the court dismissed the successive petition on two bases - I.C.
§ 19-4908 and Peterson's failure to allege a genuine issue of material fact. (R.,

pp.39-42.)
On appeal, Peterson complains that the court erred by dismissing his
petition without first resolving whether he raised the possibility of a valid claim
entitling him to counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) According to Peterson, he
"renewed his request for appointment of counsel" and the court was required to
"address that motion before deciding the substantive question of whether
summary dismissal was appropriate." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) This argument is
factually and legally erroneous.
Peterson concluded his affidavit in response to the court's notice of intent
to dismiss with the following statement: "This is why I ask the courts [sic] for a
successive post-conviction as well as a conflict attorney." (R., p.33.) This hardly
constitutes a "motion" renewing Peterson's initial request for counsel, which the
court had already denied. Even if it did, the law did not require the district court
to expressly address, yet again, Peterson's desire for counsel.

All the law

requires is that the district court consider a request for counsel "before denying
the post-conviction relief on the merits." Charboneau, supra. The court clearly
did so before denying Peterson's petition on the merits when it considered and
denied the request along with issuing its notice of intent to dismiss. Peterson has
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cited no authority for the proposition that the court was required to address the
request anew just because Peterson mentioned his desire for counsel in
response to the court's notice.

In fact, the Court's opinion in Workman, 144

Idaho 518, 164 P .3d 798, supports a contrary conclusion.
Workman filed a petition for post-conviction relief and requested counsel.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. 'The district judge ruled that she
would not appoint counsel unless she determined there was a valid basis for
post-conviction relief."

19.:.

The state filed an answer and a motion to dismiss

and, "[w]ithout further notice, the district court dismissed Workman's petition and
entered judgment as a matter of law for the State."

19.:.

The district court

summarily dismissed Workman's petition because it found Workman failed to
allege a genuine issue of material fact and, "[h)aving concluded there were no
potential claims to investigate, the district court also denied appointment of
counsel for Workman."

19.:.

On appeal, Workman challenged, among other things, the district court's
denial of his request for counsel. Workman, 144 Idaho at 529, 164 P.3d at 809.
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Workman's argument, stating: "The district
court's thorough review of Workman's allegations supports, as a reasonable
exercise of discretion, her finding that Workman's claims were frivolous and
required no further investigation."

19.:.

While Workman did not squarely address the timing of the district court's
denial, which is the basis of Peterson's complaint, the district court's actions in
Workman were consistent with the district court's actions in this case. Here, the
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district court, consistent with the law, considered Peterson's request before
dismissing his petition.

The court then considered the additional information

provided by Peterson before issuing a final decision dismissing his petition. It is
apparent from the court's final dismissal decision that it considered all of the facts
alleged by Peterson as well as the record and found there was no basis for
pursuing the claims further.

(R., pp.40-42.)

In other words, the district court

"thorough[ly] reviewed" Peterson's allegations and found Peterson "raised no
allegations sufficient to require the appointment of counsel."

Workman, 144

Idaho at 529, 164 P.3d at 809. Peterson has failed to show the manner in which
the district addressed his request for counsel was erroneous.
Peterson has also failed to show error in the district court's determination
that he failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim that would require the
appointment of counsel.

Peterson's relevant successive post-conviction claim

was that he asked his attorney7 "to provide the defense with a transcript of the
preliminary hearing in [Case No. 3748]" so that he could "provide the courts [sic]
with factual evidence that [Dorene] not only initiated contact but manipulated and
bribed [him] to continue contact even though there was a no contact order." (R.,
pp.31-32.)

Peterson further asserted that the transcript would show that an

exhibit admitted at the preliminary hearing in Case No. 3748 would support his

7

Peterson identifies the attorney to whom he made the request as Ransom
Bailey (R., p.31 ); however, Mr. Bailey did not represent Peterson in Case No.
10642, which is the underlying criminal case to which his successive petition
relates (R., p.3). While Mr. Bailey represented Peterson in Case No. 3748 (see
#39783 R., pp.34-36), Nick Wollen represented Peterson in Case No. 10642 (see
#39146/#39147 R., pp.295-301). The state will assume Peterson provided the
wrong name in his response to the court's notice since Peterson could not claim
counsel from a completely different case was ineffective in Case No. 10642.
21

claim. (R., p.32.)

Finally, Peterson averred that "after reading the preliminary

[sic] transcripts, [he] would've asked the courts to provide defense with Exhibit A"
and "it would have been found that evidence did not exist" and he "would have
taken [Case No. 3748] to trial." (R., p.33.) These allegations do not show the
possibility of a valid claim that counsel was ineffective in Case No. 10642.
As previously noted, Peterson was present at the preliminary hearing in
Case No. 37 48 and did not need to read the transcript to know what evidence
was presented at that hearing. Peterson was certainly also aware that he did not
read the preliminary hearing transcript before admitting the probation violations in
Case No. 10642, which is the only conceivable event that could be relevant to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in that case. Further, whether he would
have "taken [Case No. 37 48] to trial" had he read the transcript of a hearing at
which he was present does not mean it was deficient (or prejudicial) for counsel
not to obtain the transcript before Peterson admitted his probation violations in
Case No. 10642, especially since the charge (and subsequent guilty plea) in
Case No. 3748 was only one of the violations Peterson admitted and one of only
several the state alleged. For these reasons and given the other facts the district
court relied on its dismissal order8 (R., pp.40-41 ), and considering this is a
successive petition for which there is no apparent sufficient reason warranting its

8

While the district court's summary dismissal order addressed Peterson's failure
to allege a genuine issue of material fact, which, as noted, is a different standard
than the possibility of a valid claim standard, Judd, supra, the district court's
discussion of the facts and procedural history are still relevant to whether
Peterson alleged a possibly valid claim for purposes of appointing counsel.
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consideration, Peterson has failed to show error in the district court's denial of his
request for the appointment of counsel.
Peterson's claims that the district court erred in not considering his
request for counsel prior to dismissing his petition on the merits and erred in
concluding he failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim fail.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district
court's order summarily dismissing Peterson's successive petition for postconviction relief.
DATED this 8th day of January 2015.

~

J~~~;,jA M. LORELLO
De\J Attorney General
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MAR 24 2014
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D I ~
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY

--

oifu9\,~-:=-ca.t

THOMAS PETERSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2014-01288
ORDER FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO
LC.§ 19-4906(b)

Presently before the Court is Mr. Peterson's successive petition for post-conviction relief
filed on January 23, 2014. Simultaneously with the filing of his petition, Mr. Peterson requested
the appointment of counsel at the public's expense. The state filed its answer on February 24,
2014, and on that same date the Court issued its order denying the petitioner's motion for
counsel and its notice of intent to dismiss the petition in twenty days pursuant to section 194906(b), Idaho Code. Petitioner timely responded to the Court's notice through the filing of an
affidavit on March 3, 2014.

BACKGROUND
In the underlying case, Ada County case number CR-FE-2011-0003748, Petitioner pled
guilty to a single count of felony Violation of a No Contact Order on August 19, 2010.
Accordingly, on September 30, 2010, this Court sentenced him to a maximum term of five years,
with the first three and one-half years fixed. However, the Court suspended execution of the
judgment and placed the defendant on probation, which Mr. Peterson then violated by, inter alia,
again violating the no-contact order at issue in the underlying case. This Court revoked the
defendant's probation on September 1, 2011, and imposed his original sentence. On September
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7, 2011, the defendant filed a motion under Rule 3 5 for reconsideration of sentence in the
underlying case and in case number CR-FE-2008-0017740 (also a case involving a felony
violation of the no-contact order at issue). On October 19, 2011, the Court denied the motion.
Toe petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief (CV-PC-2012-10238) followed on June 6,
2012, in which the defendant alleged that his sentence was excessive and in which he added
allegations concerning the competence of his trial counsel with respect to the plea agreement he
accepted. That petition was dismissed on May 5, 2013.
In his present, successive petition, petitioner raised the following claims as described in
the Court's notice of intent to dismiss: (a) "due process violation by failing to maintain an
accurate copy of the record in this case;" (b) "Ineffective assistance of counsel;" and (c) "civil
rights violation." The precise failures he attributes to his counsel are that counsel allegedly
"failed to notify courts and or prosecution Defendant request a rule # 11 binding the plea
agreement" and "failed to motion as requested by the defendant to receive court transcripts from
the preliminary hearing involving CR-FE-2011-0003748." Petition ,i 9. In his affidavit of facts,
Mr. Peterson claims that "the district courts" misplaced records that were relied upon in

fashioning his sentence, specifically, telephone records used to establish his violation of one or
more no-contact orders. It appears this allegation goes to his claims denominated (a) and (c)
above. The specific relief Mr. Peterson is seeking is to have his sentences in Ada County case
numbers CR-FE-2010-0010642 and CR-FE-2011-0003748 run concurrently.
The Court held in its notice of intent to dismiss that claims (a) and (c) were procedurally
barred since these claims were raised on direct appeal and decided adversely to the petitioner.
The Court noted that claim (b) (ineffective assistance of counsel) was unsupported by any
admissible evidence and hence was subject to summary dismissal. However, the Court gave the
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petitioner an opportunity to file additional materials in support of that claim as required by
section 19-4906(b). In his supplemental affidavit, the petitioner explains that his trial counsel,
Mr. Ransom Bailey, provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain transcripts of the
preliminary hearing held in the underlying case that would have "provide[d] the courts with
factual evidence that [the victim protected by the no-contact order] not only initiated contact but
munipulated [sic] and bribed me to continue contact even though there was a no contact order."
The petitioner also states that the transcript would have shown that the state relied on "exhibit A"
for the magistrate's finding of probable cause, which consisted of phone records and text
message records, which records (in his view) prove his argument that he was manipulated and
bribed by the victim into committing the violations. He also states that if Mr. Bailey would have
obtained the transcript, he and/or the petitioner would have realized that state's exhibit "A" did
not exist (a fact the petitioner apparently has inferred because the text messages and phone
records were not contained in the appellate record in his direct appeal) and hence he (the
petitioner) would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. SUMMARY DISMISSAL

A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature; it is
distinct from the criminal action, which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36
P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). Like a
plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden of
proving the allegations upon which the petition for post-conviction relief is based by a
preponderance of evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000).
However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition differ from those of a civil action, in that
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"[t]he application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the claim." State

v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.2d 476,482 (2008). The applicant for post-conviction relief is
required to make a prima facie case by presenting admissible evidence on each essential element
of his or her claims. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); I.C. §
19-4903.
The district court is vested with the discretion of making factual findings, and must rely on
substantial, even if conflicting, evidence in the record. Martinez at 844; Holmes v. State, 104
Idaho 312,658 P.2d 983 (1983). "[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by
any admissible evidence, need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d
898 (Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612,617,651 P.2d 546,551 (Ct.App.1982). If
the allegations fail to frame a genuine issue of material fact, or fail to establish all the necessary

prima facie elements of a claim for relief, the court "may indicate to the parties its intention to
dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing." LC. § l 9-4906(b); I.C.R. 57(c); Parrott,
117 Idaho 272, 787 P.2d 258 (1990). However, if the application raises a material issue of fact,
the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each
such issue. I.C. § 19-4907(a); Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844,875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994).

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is properly raised in a post-conviction
setting. See Mathews, 839 P.2d 1215, 1219 (citing Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671,674, 603 P.2d
1005, 1008 (1979). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must overcome
the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating "that
counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of competence." Roman, 125 Idaho at
648-49, 873 P.2d at 902-03.
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Claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-part test set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Under this test, the
petitioner must not only demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, but must also
show that the deficient performance was prejudicial. Id., 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 206465. To establish deficient performance, the applicant must prove that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. To prove prejudice, the applicant must
show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Id., at 694; Parrott, 117 Idaho at 274-75, 787 P.2d at
260-62. This latter "prejudice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's ineffective
performance impacted the outcome of the case. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366,
370-71 (1985); Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,825 P.2d 94 (Ct.App.1992). In order to avoid
summary dismissal, Petitioner must allege sufficient facts under both parts of the test. Martinez
v. State, 125 Idaho 844,875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994).

DISCUSSION

I. Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim has been procedurally defaulted
because it was not raised in his prior petition.
Although the Court overlooked this issue in its notice, the State correctly pointed out in
its answer that because this is a successive petition, "[a]ll grounds for relief available to an
applicant under this act must be raised in [the] original, supplemental, or amended application."
I.C. § 19-4908. The petitioner's ineffective assistance claim(s) relating to Mr. Bailey's failure to
obtain a preliminary hearing transcript appear for the first time in this supplemental petition and
hence are waived, "unless the court finds a ... sufficient reason [it] was not asserted or was
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." Id. Petitioner has not
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offered any such reason, and it appears he could not, because based upon the claim itself, he
necessarily knew of Mr. Bailey's allegedly deficient performance long before he filed his first
petition for post-conviction relief. 1 Thus, he knowingly and voluntarily waived it when he failed
to include it in his first petition, and it must be dismissed.
II. In the alternative to waiver, the petitioner has failed to create a genuine issue of

material fact as to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim(s).
The allegation that Mr. Bailey failed to obtain a transcript of the preliminary hearing, even if
true, cannot support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on any of the theories asserted
by the petitioner. First, even if the transcript and any exhibits showed that the victim actively
solicited, encouraged, and/or "bribed" or "manipulated" the petitioner into (once more) violating
the no-contact order in issue, such evidence is not a defense to the charge. It is relevant, if at all,
only in mitigation of sentencing and/or probation violation proceedings, where it was in fact
offered by the petitioner. Mr. Bailey acted competently in not advising the petitioner to go to
trial based upon such evidence, assuming it existed, and the petitioner could have experienced no
prejudice from this advice or from Mr. Bailey's failure to obtain the transcript.
Petitioner also claims that the transcript, had it been obtained, would have enabled him to
discover the non-existence of the text and phone records used by the state to establish probable
cause that he had violated the no-contact order in issue. Such a discovery, he claims, would have
prompted him to take the case to trial.
This claim fails for two reasons. First, the disposition of the underlying case was already
affirmed over the petitioner's objection that the text and phone records in issue were missing

1 Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has very recently clarified that the inadequate representation of prior postconviction counsel is no longer a sufficient basis for accepting a claim raised for the first time in a successive
petition. Murphy v. State, 40483, 2014 WL 712695 (Idaho Feb. 25, 2014) (not yet released for publication).
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from the appellate record. This claim appears to be an unsubtle attempt to relitigate the issue of
the missing records, and the Court will not consider issues barred by the doctrine of res Judi cata.
Second, there is a crucial distinction between claiming that certain documents were not
included in the appellate record and claiming that those documents did not exist as exhibits in a
particular hearing, or did not exist at all. Petitioner, reasoning backward from the absence of
phone and text message records in the appellate record, appears to assume from that absence that
the phone and text message records never existed, or at least had been lost by a particular point
in time, and hence the state had no proof with which to convict him. Petitioner also neglects to
square this claim with his repeated admission that he did violate the no-contact order and that the
records of his communications with the victim would prove his theory that the victim
manipulated him into violating the o~der. In any event, it cannot be ineffective assistance of
counsel for Mr. Bailey to fail to obtain a particular transcript in order to see if a particular exhibit
had fortuitously been lost by the state. If the records in question are in fact lost at this point, it is
clear enough on this record that no one knew they had gone missing until the appeal. Counsel's
performance is assessed in light of the facts and circumstances known or existent at the time the
performance is rendered, not with the benefit of hindsight. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 147,
139 P.3d 741, 749 (Ct. App. 2006). Additionally, it appears that the petitioner has never denied
the contact that occurred, only the extent to which he initiated it. Thus, Mr. Bailey would have
had no reason to obtain the transcript in issue, since his client admitted to the crime.

For all these reasons, petitioner's supplemented allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel on the part of Mr. Bailey fail to supply sufficient facts under either prong of the
Strickland test to create a genuine issue of material fact for hearing. Further, his other claims
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-

-

are, as noted in the Court's prior notice of intent, procedurally barred since they were raised on
direct appeal. Accordi...'1gly, the petition will be dismissed.

. ,,,.,6r

SO ORDERED AND DATED th1~ day of March, 2014.
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